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Abstract
We consider the following (promise) problem, denoted
ED (for Entropy Difference): The input is a pair of
circuits, and YES instances (resp., NO instances) are such
pairs in which the ﬁrst (resp., second) circuit generates a
distribution with noticeably higher entropy.
On one hand we show that any language having a
(honest-veriﬁer) statistical zero-knowledge proof is Karp-
reducible to ED. On the other hand, we present a public-
coin (honest-veriﬁer) statistical zero-knowledge proof for
ED. Thus, we obtain an alternative proof of Okamoto’s re-
sult by which
H
V
S
Z
K (i.e., honest-veriﬁer statistical zero
knowledge) equals public-coin
H
V
S
Z
K. The new proof is
much simpler than the original one. The above also yields
a trivial proof that
H
V
S
Z
K is closed under complementa-
tion(since ED easily reducesto its complement). Amongthe
new results obtained is an equivalence of a weak notion of
statistical zero knowledge to the standard one.
1 Introduction
Zero-Knowledgeproofs, introduced by Goldwasser, Mi-
cali and Rackoff [16], are fascinating and extremely useful
constructs. Their fascinating nature is due to their seem-
ingly contradictory nature; they are both convincing and
yet yield nothing beyond the validity of the assertion being
proven. Their applicability in the domain of cryptography
is vast; they are typically used to force malicious parties
to behave according to a predetermined protocol (which re-
quires parties to provide proofs of the correctness of their
secret-based actions without revealing these secrets).
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Zero-knowledge proofs come in many ﬂavors. One cen-
tral parameter is to the strength of the zero-knowledge (or
simulability) condition: The requirement that the veriﬁer
learns nothing from the proof is formulated by saying that
the transcript of its interaction with the prover can be simu-
lated by the veriﬁer itself. That is, there exists an efﬁcient
procedure that, when given a valid assertion as input, pro-
duces a distribution which is “similar” to the distribution of
transcripts of the executions of the proof system on that as-
sertion. The key parameter is the interpretation of “similar-
ity”. Three notions have been commonly considered in the
literature (cf., [16, 10]). Perfect zero knowledge (
P
Z
K) re-
quiresthat the two distributionsbe identical. Statisticalzero
knowledge (
S
Z
K) requires that these distributions be sta-
tistically close (i.e., the variation distance between them is
negligible). Finally, computational zero knowledge (
C
Z
K)
refers to the case that these distributions are computation-
ally indistinguishable (cf., [15, 26]).
This paperfocuseson statistical zeroknowledge(
S
Z
K).
This class has quite an intriguing status in complexity the-
ory. On one hand,
S
Z
K contains several problems which
are commonly believed to be hard (i.e., not in
B
P
P) such
as Quadratic Residuosity [16], Graph Isomorphism [13],
and a problem equivalent to the Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem [12]. On the other hand,
S
Z
K lies quite low in the
Polynomial-Time Hierarchy; speciﬁcally, it lies in the in-
tersection
A
M
 
c
o
A
M (cf., [10, 1]). (Recall that
A
M
denotesthe class of two-roundArthur-Merlinproofs, which
by [17] and [3] is equivalent to constant-round interactive
proofs.) Furthermore,
S
Z
K has a (natural) complete prob-
lem [24] (and we are goingto see anotherone in this paper).
Additional motivation for studying statistical zero
knowledge comes from cryptography. For one, it offers
a higher level of security than computational zero knowl-
edge; that is,
S
Z
K provides information-theoretic (or ab-
solute) security whereas
C
Z
K only provides computational
security (i.e., security against adversaries of bounded com-
putational resources). Another motivation for the study of
S
Z
K is that it provides a good test ground for developing
techniquesto study
C
Z
K proofs (cf., [21, 22, 6, 7, 14]). We
note that although it is long known that
C
Z
K
 
I
P (pro-vided one-way functions exist; cf., [13, 19, 4]), the devel-
opment of methodologies for the construction of (efﬁcient)
zero-knowledgeproof systems is still of great importance.
The study of
S
Z
K has gained much momentum in re-
cent years. In particular, two results which assert trans-
formations of one type of
S
Z
K proof system into another,
have played an important role in recent study. A key notion
in these results is the notion of honest-veriﬁer
S
Z
K, de-
noted
H
V
S
Z
K. Unlike the general notion of
S
Z
K, which
requiresthat no matter what the veriﬁer does, it learns noth-
ing from the interaction with the prover, here one only re-
quires that the “honest” veriﬁer (i.e., one that follows the
prescribed protocol) learns nothing from the interaction.
The two results referred to above are:
Thm. I: Every promise problem
  having a honest-veriﬁer
S
Z
K proof system has also a public-coin honest-
veriﬁer
S
Z
K proof system (cf., Okamoto [20]).
Thm. II: Every promise problem having a public-coin
honest-veriﬁer
S
Z
K proof system has a (public-coin)
general
S
Z
K proof system (cf., Goldreich, Sahai and
Vadhan [14]).
Combining these two results one obtains that any promise
problem having a honest-veriﬁer
S
Z
K proof system also
has a general
S
Z
K proof system (i.e., one in which zero-
knowledge holds with respect to any cheating veriﬁer). We
stress the key role of Thm. I in providingthe adequate start-
ing point for Thm. II. Furthermore, the starting point pro-
vided by Thm. I is relied on also in the following intriguing
results:
Thm. III: The class
H
V
S
Z
K is closed undercomplemen-
tation (cf., Okamoto [20]): That is, if a promise prob-
lem has a honest-veriﬁer
S
Z
K proof system then so
has its complement.
Thm. IV: The class
H
V
S
Z
K has a natural complete prob-
lem (cf., Sahai and Vadhan [24]).
Thus, Thm. I plays a key role in this area. Unfortunately,
the proof of Thm. I in [20] is very complicated and was
fully understood by very few researchers.
The primary motivation of this work is to provide a
simpler proof of Thm. I. Our basic idea is to apply some
of Okamoto’s techniques [20] to the Aiello–Hastad trans-
formation [1] of
H
V
S
Z
K into
A
M, rather than apply-
ing them (as done in [20]) to the Goldwasser–Sipser trans-
formation [17] of
I
P into
A
M. To further clarify the
proof, we introduce a new promise problem, and show that:
(1) any problem in
H
V
S
Z
K reduces to the new promise
problem, and (2) the new promise problem has a public-
coin
H
V
S
Z
K proofsystem. Combining(1) and(2), Thm.I
follows.
  A promise problem
  is a pair of disjoint sets of strings, correspond-
ing to
y
e
s and
n
o instances, respectively [9].
1.1 Statistical zero-knowledge proof systems
Following [12], we extend the standard deﬁnition of
interactive proof systems to promise problems
 
 
 
 
y
e
s
 
 
n
o
 . Thatis, werequirethecompletenesscondition
toholdfor
y
e
s instances(i.e.,
x
 
 
y
e
s),requirethesound-
ness condition to hold for
n
o instances (i.e.,
x
 
 
n
o), and
donot requireanythingfor inputswhich violatethe promise
(i.e.,
x
 
 
 
y
e
s
 
 
n
o).
This paper focuses on such proof systems which are
honest-veriﬁer statistical zero-knowledge:
Deﬁnition 1.1 (Honest-veriﬁer statistical zero knowledge
–
H
V
S
Z
K): Let
 
P
 
V
  be an interactive proof system for
a promise problem
 
 
 
 
y
e
s
 
 
n
o
 .
  We denote by
h
P
 
V
i
 
x
  the view of the veriﬁer
V
while interacting with
P on common input
x; this con-
sistsofthecommoninput,
V ’sinternalcointosses, and
all messages it has received.
 
 
P
 
V
  is said to be honest-veriﬁer statistical zero
knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time machine(called a simulator),
S, and a negligible
 
function
 
 
N
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (calledthesimulatordeviation)
so that for every
x
 
 
y
e
s the statistical difference be-
tween
S
 
x
  and
h
P
 
V
i
 
x
  is at most
 
 
j
x
j
 .
 
H
V
S
Z
K denotes the class of promise problems hav-
ing honest-veriﬁer statistical zero-knowledge interac-
tive proof systems.
We comment that general statistical zero-knowledge proof
systems are such where the zero-knowledge requirement
holds for any (polynomial-time computable) veriﬁer stat-
egy, rather than merely for the prescribed/honest veriﬁer
V .
Actually, even a stronger requirement can be proven to be
equivalent to
H
V
S
Z
K – see [14].
1.2 Public-coin versus general proof systems
Recall that public-coin (a.k.a Arthur-Merlin) proof sys-
tems [2, 3] are interactive proof systems [16] in which the
prescribed veriﬁer’s strategy amounts to sending uniformly
chosen messages at each round, and deciding whether to
accept by evaluating a polynomial-time predicate of the
conversation transcript. That is, in each round, the veri-
ﬁer tosses a predetermined number of coins and sends the
outcome to the prover, and at the end it decides whether
to accept by applying a predicate to the (full) sequence of
messages it has sent and received.
Public-coin proof systems are easier to analyze and
manipulate than general interactive proofs, and thus the
 Recall that a function
f
 
N
 
N is negligible if for any polynomial
p
 
 
 ,
f
 
n
 
 
 
 
p
 
n
  for sufﬁciently large
n.result of Goldwasser and Sipser [17] by which the for-
mer are as powerful as the latter found many applications
(e.g., [11, 19, 4]). As mentioned above, the same and more
so is true regarding statistical zero knowledge: That is,
Okamoto’s result [20] (i.e., Thm. I), by which public-coin
H
V
S
Z
K equals
H
V
S
Z
K, has played a major role in sub-
sequentresults(e.g., Thms.II,III,andIVmentionedabove).
Thus, providing a clear proof of Thm. I is of major impor-
tance to this area.
1.3 A new
H
V
S
Z
K-complete problem: Entropy
Difference
The new promise problem referred to earlier is called
Entropy Difference. The promise problem involves
the entropies of distributions which are encoded by circuits
which sample from them. That is, if
X is a circuit map-
ping
f
 
 
 
g
m to
f
 
 
 
g
n, we identify
X with the probability
distribution induced on
f
 
 
 
g
n by feeding
X the uniform
distribution on
f
 
 
 
g
m. We write
H
 
X
  for the entropy of
distribution
X (deﬁned in Section 2.1).
Deﬁnition 1.2 (Entropy Difference): The promise problem
Entropy Difference, denoted
E
D
 
 
E
D
y
e
s
 
E
D
n
o
 ,
consists of
E
D
y
e
s
d
e
f
 
f
 
X
 
Y
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
 
 
 
g
E
D
n
o
d
e
f
 
f
 
X
 
Y
 
 
H
 
Y
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
 
g
where
X and
Y are distributions encoded as circuits which
sample from them.
As stated above, our main results are
Theorem 1.3 (
H
V
S
Z
K-hardness): Any promise problem
in
H
V
S
Z
K reduces (via a Karp reduction) to ED.
(Theorem1.3 combinedwith a simple constant-roundinter-
activeproofforED impliesthat
H
V
S
Z
K
 
A
M
 
c
o
A
M.
We believe that this providesa much simpler argumentthan
the one presented in [10, 1], although it does use all the un-
derlying ideas of these works.)
 
Theorem 1.4 (ED in public-coin
H
V
S
Z
K): ED has a
public-coin honest-veriﬁer statistical zero-knowledge proof
system.
CombiningTheorems1.3 and 1.4,
  we see that any promise
problem in
H
V
S
Z
K has a public-coin
H
V
S
Z
K proof
  We note that much of the simpliﬁcation is due to [23].
  Actually, we also use the fact that the reduction in Theorem 1.3 is
not length-decreasing. Alternatively, one may use the fact that ED is easily
padded to increase the length of instance descriptions.
system. Thus, we provide an alternative (and much sim-
pler) proof of Thm. I. Furthermore, observing that ED eas-
ily reduces to its complement, it follows that
H
V
S
Z
K is
closed under complementation (i.e., we provide an alterna-
tive proof of Thm. III).
Discussion: Some superﬁcial similarity does exist be-
tween the above and what was done in [24]. In the
latter work, the authors deﬁned a promise problem,
called Statistical Difference (denoted SD),
  and
showed that it is complete for the class
H
V
S
Z
K. How-
ever, their reduction of
H
V
S
Z
K to SD used Thm. I to re-
strict attention to public-coin
H
V
S
Z
K only. Thus, the re-
sults in [24] (relying on Thm. I) cannot be used to establish
Thm.I.Furthermore,the
H
V
S
Z
K proofsystemforSDpre-
sented in [24] is not of the public-coin type.
In retrospect,the termstatistical zeroknowledge(coined
by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [16]) sounds prophetic
of the key role playedby computationalproblemsregarding
statistical measures in the study of this class (which is also
known by the name “almost-perfect zero knowledge”).
1.4 Extensions
Let us stress that by (honest-veriﬁer) statistical zero
knowledge we mean a simulation, up to negligible devia-
tion error, by a strict (rather than expected) probabilistic
polynomial-time machine. This makes Theorem 1.4 seem-
ingly stronger, but potentially weakens Theorem 1.3. How-
ever, as we shortly explain, Theorem 1.3 is in fact stronger
than stated.
Deﬁnition 1.5 (simulator deviation): Let
 
P
 
V
  be a proof
system for a promise problem
 
 
 
 
y
e
s
 
 
n
o
 , and let
M be a probabilistic polynomial-time machine. Suppose
that for some function
 
 
N
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and every
x
 
 
y
e
s
thestatistical differencebetweentheveriﬁer’sview, denoted
h
P
 
V
i
 
x
  and
M
 
x
  is at most
 
 
j
x
j
 . Then we say that
M
simulates
 
P
 
V
  with deviation
 .
As deﬁned above,
H
V
S
Z
K is the class of promise prob-
lems having interactive proofswith negligiblesimulator de-
viation. A weaker level of security (or zero-knowledge
property) is provided by the notion of weak-
H
V
S
Z
K
(which is analogousto weak-
S
Z
K considered in, e.g., [8]):
  Statistical Difference, denoted
S
D
 
 
S
D
y
e
s
 
S
D
n
o
 , con-
sists of
S
D
y
e
s
d
e
f
 
f
 
X
 
Y
 
 
 
 
X
 
Y
 
 
 
 
 
g
S
D
n
o
d
e
f
 
f
 
X
 
Y
 
 
 
 
X
 
Y
 
 
 
 
 
g
where
X and
Y are as in Deﬁnition 1.2, and
 
 
X
 
Y
  denote the statisti-
cal difference between them (i.e.,
 
 
X
 
Y
 
d
e
f
 
 
 
 
P
 
j
P
r
 
X
 
 
 
 
P
r
 
Y
 
 
 
j).Deﬁnition 1.6 (weak-
H
V
S
Z
K): A proof system is said to
be weak (honest-veriﬁer) statistical zero knowledge if for
every polynomial
p there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time machine
M
p which simulates the proof system with
simulator deviation
 
 
p
 
 
 .
Speciﬁcally, the running-time of
M
p may depend on
p.
Note that weak-
H
V
S
Z
K contains promise problems hav-
ing
H
V
S
Z
K proof sytems under a liberal deﬁnition al-
lowing expected polynomial-time simulators. That is, sup-
pose that
  has an interactive proof system
 
P
 
V
  and
an expected polynomial-time simulator
M which simulates
 
P
 
V
  with negligible deviation. Then, for any polyno-
mial
p, we can construct a strict polynomial-time simulator
M
p which simulates
 
P
 
V
  with deviation
 
 
p
 
 
  simply
by truncating long runs of
M; that is, runs which take more
than
p times the expected number of steps. It follows that
 
P
 
V
  is a weak-
H
V
S
Z
K proof system. All these vari-
ants of
H
V
S
Z
K are covered by the following extension of
Theorem 1.3:
Theorem 1.7 (Theorem 1.3, extended): Any promise prob-
lem in weak-
H
V
S
Z
K reduces(via a Karpreduction)to ED.
In fact, the proof only utilizes a simulator with deviation
smaller than the reciprocal of the (cube of the) total number
of bits sent in the proof system. On the other hand, Theo-
rem 1.4 can be strengthened as follows:
Theorem 1.8 (Theorem 1.4, extended): ED has a public-
coin proof system which can be simulated with exponen-
tially vanishing deviation.
Combining Theorems 1.7 and 1.8, we get
Corollary 1.9 Every language in weak-
H
V
S
Z
K has a
public-coin proof system which can be simulated with ex-
ponentially vanishing deviation.
Using the results in [14] we infer that weak-
H
V
S
Z
K
equals
S
Z
K, where the latter refers to statistical zero
knowledge against any veriﬁer. Speciﬁcally,
Corollary 1.10 Every language in weak-
H
V
S
Z
K has a
(public-coin) general statistical zero-knowledge proof sys-
tem. Furthermore, the latter can be simulated using a uni-
versal probabilistic polynomial-time simulator which uses
any veriﬁer strategy as a black-box and has only an expo-
nentially vanishing deviation.
1.5 Techniques
As stated above our main results are Theorems 1.3
and 1.4 which establish, respectively, a Karp reduction of
H
V
S
Z
K to ED, and a public-coin honest-veriﬁer
S
Z
K
proof system for ED.
The proof of the ﬁrst main result relies on the works of
Fortnow,AielloandHastad[10,1]. Thekeyobservationun-
derlying these works is that any simulator establishing the
(honest-veriﬁer)
S
Z
K property of a proof system must be-
have very differently on YES and NO-instances. This differ-
ence is used in [10, 1] in orderto constructcertain constant-
round proof systems. We use this difference to construct a
reduction to ED. Speciﬁcally, we use the characterization
of the simulator’s behavior as provided in [1] and further
simpliﬁed in [23]. This characterizationallows us to reduce
instances of any problem in
H
V
S
Z
K to instances of ED.
The proof of the second main result relies on the work
of Okamoto [20]. Speciﬁcally, we follow his basic idea of
“complementaryusageofmessages”andusetwoofhissub-
protocols. We stress that we provide self-contained deﬁni-
tions, implementations and analysis of the latter two sub-
protocols.
1.6 Open Problems
Our proof of Thm. I (as well as the original proof of
Okamoto [20]) actually provides a transformation of proof
systems (from private-coin to public-coin while preserving
a certain zero-knowledgeproperty,namely
H
V
S
Z
K). Nei-
ther our transformation nor Okamoto’s preserves the num-
ber of rounds in the original proof system, nor the compu-
tational complexity of the prover. It would be desirable to
present an alternative transformation which does preserve
both complexity measures, and it would be of interest even
to present a transformation which preserves only one of
these measures.
For a wider perspective, we mention the following facts.
1. The transformation of private-coin interactive proofs
to public-coin ones (cf., [17]) preserves the number of
rounds (up to an additive constant), but does not pre-
serve the computational complexity of the prover.
(Note that this transformation does not seem to pre-
serve any zero-knowledge property. Furthermore, it
is not known how to transform computational zero-
knowledge proofs into public-coin ones (without as-
suming the existence of one-way functions which al-
lows one to construct the latter from scratch).)
2. The transformation of honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge
public-coin proof systems into general zero-
knowledgeones(cf.,[14])preservesthe computational
complexity of the prover and only increases mildly the
round complexity.
(Actually, this transformation preserves both mea-
sures, but introduces a noticeable soundness errorwhich can be eliminated by repeatingthe proof system
sequentially any non-constant number of times.)
1.7 Organization
InSection2, weproveTheorem1.3; thatis, weshowthat
every problem in
H
V
S
Z
K reduces to
E
D. In Section 3, we
prove Theorem 1.4; that is, we exhibit a public coin statisti-
cal zero-knowledgeproof system for
E
D. This proof system
uses two subprotocols which are speciﬁed in Section 3 and
implemented in Section 4.
2
H
V
S
Z
K reduces to
E
D
In this section, we prove Theorems 1.3 and 1.7, which
state that every problem in
H
V
S
Z
K (and weak-
H
V
S
Z
K)
reduces to
E
D. Our reduction is based on the Aiello–Hastad
characterization of statistical zero-knowledge [1]. Follow-
ing Petrank and Tardos [23], we present the Aiello–Hastad
characterization using a formulation of entropy, rather than
in the formulation of set sizes used in [1].
In Section 2.1, we deﬁne the information-theoretic no-
tions used in the Aiello–Hastad characterization. In Sec-
tion 2.2, we motivate and state the lemmas which com-
prisetheAiello–Hastadcharacterization(withproofsinAp-
pendixA). InSection2.3,weexhibitthereductionfromany
problem in
H
V
S
Z
K to
E
D, prove its correctness using the
Aiello–Hastad characterization, and thereby deduce Theo-
rems 1.3 and 1.7.
2.1 Entropy and Relative Entropy
Recall the deﬁnition of the entropy, denoted
H
 
X
 , of a
random variable
X:
H
 
X
 
d
e
f
 
X
 
P
r
 
X
 
 
 
 
l
o
g
 
 
 
P
r
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
E
 
 
X
 
l
o
g
 
 
 
P
r
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
where all logarithms above and in the sequel are to base
2. The binary entropy function,
H
 
 
p
 
d
e
f
 
p
l
o
g
 
 
 
p
 
 
 
 
 
p
 
l
o
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
 
 , equals the entropy of a 0-1 random
variable with expectation
p.
We will make use of two measures of similarity between
probability distributions. The ﬁrst measure is the well-
known statistical difference: The statistical difference be-
tween the random variables
X and
Y , denoted
 
 
X
 
Y
 ,
is deﬁned by
 
 
X
 
Y
 
d
e
f
 
 
 
 
X
 
j
P
r
 
X
 
 
 
 
P
r
 
X
 
 
 
j
 
m
a
x
S
f
P
r
 
X
 
S
 
 
P
r
 
Y
 
S
 
g
The second measure is the Kullback–Leibler distance:
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let
X and
Y be two probability distribu-
tions on a ﬁnite set
D. The relative entropy (or Kullback–
Leibler distance) between
X and
Y is deﬁned as
K
L
 
X
j
Y
 
 
E
 
 
X
 
l
o
g
P
r
 
X
 
 
 
P
r
 
Y
 
 
 
 
 
We let
K
L
 
 
p
 
q
 
d
e
f
 
p
l
o
g
 
p
 
q
 
 
 
 
 
p
 
l
o
g
 
 
 
 
p
 
 
 
 
 
q
 
 . Note that if
X and
Y are 0-1 random variables
with expections
p and
q respectively, then
K
L
 
X
j
Y
 
 
K
L
 
 
p
 
q
 . It can be shown that
K
L
 
X
j
Y
  is always
nonnegative and
K
L
 
X
j
Y
 
 
  iff
X and
Y are identi-
cally distributed [5, Thm. 2.6.3]. Hence,
K
L
 
X
j
Y
  can
be viewed as some sort of “distance” between
X and
Y ,
though it does not satisfy symmetry or the triangle inequal-
ity.
2.2 The Aiello–Hastad Characterization
In this section, we motivate and state the lemmas which
comprise the Aiello–Hastad characterization of statistical
zero-knowledge. Proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Intution. Let
  be any language (or promise problem) in
H
V
S
Z
K and consider a statistical zero-knowledge proof
system for
  and the corresponding simulator. We think of
the output of the simulator as describing the moves of a vir-
tual prover and a virtual veriﬁer. Following Fortnow [10],
the Aiello–Hastad characterization describes properties of
the output of the simulator which distinguish between
y
e
s
instances and
n
o instances. One thing we are guaranteed
by the statistical zero-knowledge property is that the simu-
lator outputs accepting conversations with high probability
when the input is a
y
e
s instance. Thus, if on some input
x,
the simulator outputsrejectingor invalidconversationswith
high probability,
x is easily identiﬁed to be a
n
o-instance.
The difﬁculty comes from the fact that the simulator might
output accepting conversations with high probability even
when
x is a
n
o-instance, even though this cannot occur
when any real prover interacts with the true veriﬁer due
to the soundness of the proof system. Intuitively, this dis-
crepancy comes from the fact that the virtual prover has the
ability to cheat and “see” future veriﬁer messages, a power
which the real prover does not have. Thus, Aiello and Has-
tad consider what happens when one takes away the power
of the virtual prover to cheat. That is, following [10], they
consider a real prover strategy
P
S, called the simulation-
based prover, which determines its messages based on the
same distribution as the virtual prover’sresidual probability
space conditioned only on past messages. Now, the interac-
tion between
P
S and the real veriﬁer describes exactly what
happens when we take away the power of the simulated
prover to cheat. Thus, the relative entropy between the out-
put of
S and the interactionbetween
P
S and the real veriﬁeris a measure of the amount of cheating that virtual prover
performs, and this distinguishes between
y
e
s instances and
n
o instances. The ﬁnal crucial observation in the Aiello–
Hastad characterization is that this relative entropy can be
rewritten as a simple expression involving entropies of pre-
ﬁxes of the simulator’s output.
Notation. Let
  be any language (or promise problem)
in
H
V
S
Z
K (or weak-
H
V
S
Z
K) and let
 
P
 
V
  be a sta-
tistical zero-knowledge proof system for
  with simulator
S. Without loss of generality, we assume that on inputs of
length
n, the veriﬁer tosses exactly
 
 
 
 
n
  coins, and the
interaction between
P and
V consists of
 
r
 
 
r
 
n
  mes-
sages, each of length
 
 
 
 
n
  so that the prover’smessages
are those with odd index. Also, we may assume that the last
message of the veriﬁer consists of its random coins. We are
interested in the random variables,
h
P
 
V
i
 
x
  and
S
 
x
 , de-
scribingtherealinteractionandthesimulation,respectively.
We also consider preﬁxes of these random variables, where
h
P
 
V
i
 
x
 
i and
S
 
x
 
i denote the preﬁx of length
i
 
  of the
corresponding random variable. At times, we may drop
x
from these notations. We say that a
 
r
 
  bit string
  is a
transcript (w.r.t
V ) if the veriﬁer messages in
  correspond
to what it would havesent giventhe randomcoins(as speci-
ﬁedinthelast bitsin
 )andpreviousmessagesoftheprover
(includedin
 ). We say that a transcript
  is acceptingif the
veriﬁer accepts on it.
The simulation-based prover. Given an execution pre-
ﬁx
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
 
i
 
 
 
 , the simulation-based prover, denoted
P
S, responses as follows:
  If
S
 
x
  outputs conversations that begin with
  with
probability
 , then
P
S replies with a dummy message,
say
 
 
 
j
x
j
 .
  Otherwise,
P
S replies according with the same con-
ditional probability as the prover in the output of the
simulator. That is, it replies
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
 
 
j
x
j
  with prob-
ability
p
 
 
P
r
 
S
 
x
 
i
 
 
 
j
S
 
x
 
i
 
 
 
 
 
Following our previous notation, we denote conversation
transcripts coming from the interaction between
P
S and
V
by
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 , and its preﬁxes by
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
i.
Rewriting
K
L
 
S
 
x
 
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
 . The Aiello–Hastad
characterizationuses the relative entropy between
S
 
x
  and
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
  to distinguish between
y
e
s and
n
o instances.
This relative entropy
K
L
 
S
 
x
 
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
  can be rewrit-
ten asa simple expressionreferringonly to entropiesof pre-
ﬁxes of
S
 
x
 .
Lemma 2.2 (implicit in [1], explicit in [23]):
K
L
 
S
 
x
 
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
r
X
i
 
 
 
H
 
S
 
x
 
 
i
 
 
H
 
S
 
x
 
 
i
 
 
 
 
The behaviour of
P
S on
y
e
s instances: Note that even
in case of a
y
e
s instance, the behaviour of
P
S need not ex-
actly ﬁt the behaviorof eitherthe prescribedprover
P or the
simulated prover (i.e., the distribution of prover messages
in the output of the simulator) . Yet, in the case of
y
e
s in-
stance, prover
P
S behaves “almost” as
P and the simulated
prover. More generally,
Lemma 2.3 (implicit in
[1, 23]): Let
 
d
e
f
 
 
 
S
 
x
 
 
h
P
 
V
i
 
x
 
  and suppose that
 
 
 
 
 . Then,
K
L
 
S
 
x
 
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
 
H
 
 
 
 
The behaviour of
P
S on
n
o instances: In contraryto the
above, for
n
o instances, if
S
 
x
  outputs accepting tran-
scripts with high probability then
S
 
x
  and
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
must be very different. More generally,
Lemma 2.4 (implicit in [1, 23]): Let
p denote the prob-
ability that
S
 
x
  outputs an accepting transcript, and
q
be the maximum, taken over all possible provers
P
 , that
h
P
 
 
V
i
 
x
  is accepting. Suppose that
p
 
q. Then,
K
L
 
S
 
x
 
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
 
 
K
L
 
 
p
 
q
 
2.3 The Reduction
Using the above characterization,we easily Karp-reduce
any promise problem
  in
H
V
S
Z
K (or weak-
H
V
S
Z
K) to
E
D. Let
 
P
 
V
  and
S be a proof system and a simulator
as formulated in the previous subsection (namely, the proof
system consists of
 
r messages of length
  and the veri-
ﬁer’s last message consists of its random coins). Then, an
instance
x is reduced to a pair of distributions
 
X
x
 
Y
x
  as
follows.
 
X
x is the cross product of the distributions
S
 
x
 
 ,
S
 
x
 
 , ...,
S
 
x
 
 
r.
 
Y
x is the cross product of the distributions
S
 
x
 
 ,
S
 
x
 
 , ...,
S
 
x
 
 
r
 
  and a uniform distribution on
 
 
j
x
j
 
 
  bits.
Lemma 2.5 (Validity of the reduction): Suppose that
S
simulates a proof system
 
P
 
V
  with soundness error
 
 Recall that the soundness error
s
 
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
  of an interactive proof
system
 
P
 
V
  is an upper bound on the probability that the veriﬁer ac-
cepts after interacting with any potential prover strategy
P
  on input a
n
o
instance of length
n.at most
 
 
  for
  with simulator deviation smaller than
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
 . Further suppose that
S always outputs an ac-
cepting transcript. Then,
1. If
x
 
 
y
e
s then
H
 
X
x
 
 
H
 
Y
x
 
 
 .
2. If
x
 
 
n
o then
H
 
Y
x
 
 
H
 
X
x
 
 
 .
The extra condition (of always outputing an accepting tran-
script) can be easily enforced by a minor modiﬁcation of
the simulator (and possibly the proof systems). See details
in the proof of Theorems 1.3 and 1.7 below.
Proof: We may assume that
r
 
 
 
 
 , by simply padding
messageswithextrabits. Supposeﬁrstthat
x
 
 
y
e
s. Com-
bining Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, we have
H
 
Y
x
 
 
H
 
X
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
X
i
 
 
H
 
S
 
x
 
 
i
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
X
i
 
 
H
 
S
 
x
 
 
i
 
 
 
K
L
 
S
 
x
 
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
 
H
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where
 
d
e
f
 
 
 
S
 
x
 
 
h
P
 
V
i
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
 , and the last
inequality also uses
H
 
 
 
 
 
p
 
 
  (since
 
 
 
 
 
 ) and
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r. Thus,
H
 
X
x
 
 
H
 
Y
x
 
 
  and
 
X
x
 
Y
x
 
 
E
D
y
e
s follows.
Suppose now that
x
 
 
n
o. Combining Lemmas 2.2
and 2.4, we have
H
 
Y
x
 
 
H
 
X
x
 
 
K
L
 
S
 
x
 
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
K
L
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
l
o
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
(In the ﬁrst inequality, we used
K
L
 
S
 
x
 
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
 
 
K
L
 
 
 
 
q
 , where
q is the the maximum, taken over all
possible provers
P
 , that
h
P
 
 
V
i
 
x
  is accepting.) Thus,
H
 
Y
x
 
 
H
 
X
x
 
 
  and
 
X
x
 
Y
x
 
 
E
D
n
o follows.
Proof of Theorems 1.3 and 1.7: Let
  be any promise
problem in weak-
H
V
S
Z
K and consider any weak-
H
V
S
Z
K proof system for
 . Informally, by repeating the
proof system
p
o
l
y
 
n
  times (either sequentially or in paral-
lel) and modifying the proof system and simulator slightly,
we can easily satisfy the requirements of Lemma 2.5.
Namely, we obtain a proof system with soundness error at
most
 
 
  in which the last message of the veriﬁer consists
of its random coins (as was required throughoutthe Aiello–
Hastad characterization), together with a simulator which
alwaysoutputsacceptingtranscriptsandhassimulatordevi-
ation at most
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
 . Once these conditions are satisﬁed,
Lemma 2.5 tells us that the map
x
 
 
 
X
x
 
Y
x
  is a Karp re-
duction from
  to
E
D, yielding Theorem 1.7. Theorem 1.3
then follows as a special case. Below, we do the calcula-
tions in more detail to show that the original proof system
need onlyhave a simulator achievingdeviationsmaller than
the reciprocal of the (cube of the) total number of bits sent
in the proof system (plus the number of coins used by the
veriﬁer).
Suppose the proof system for
  consists of
 
r
 
 
  mes-
sages of length
m, and let
 
 
 
m
a
x
 
m
 
q
 , where
q is the
number of coins used by the veriﬁer. Assume the proof
system has completeness and sounded errors both bounded
by 1/3 and simulator deviation
 
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
l
o
g
r
 
 
 
 
 
 . We
nowmodifythe proofsystem by havingthe veriﬁersend the
prover its coins at the end and modify the simulator accord-
ingly. This does not affect the completeness error, sound-
ness error, or simulator deviation. Now there are
 
r
  mes-
sages, each of length at most
 
 . Repeating the proof sys-
tem for
k times (either sequentially or in parallel) and rul-
ing by majority, we obtain two-sided error of
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
k
 
 .
Using
k
 
 
 
l
o
g
r
 
 
 
  we obtain a proof system with to-
tal communication
 
r
 
 
O
 
r
 
 
 
l
o
g
r
 
 
 
 , two-sided error
 
 
r
 
 
 
 
 
  and simulation error
 
 
r
 
 
 
 
 
 .
Next, modify the proof system so that
 
 
r
  becomes an
accepting transcript, and modify the simulator so that it al-
ways outputs an accepting transcript (by possibly substitut-
ing the output with
 
 
r
 ). The resulting proof system has
soundness error at most
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
 
 
 
 , and the simula-
tion error is at most
 
 
r
 
 
 
 . Assuming, without loss of
generality, that
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , we are in position
to apply Lemma 2.5, and the theorems follow.
3 A public-coin
H
V
S
Z
K proof system for
E
D
In this section, we prove Theorems 1.4 and 1.8. That
is, we present a public-coin honest-veriﬁer statistical zero-
knowledge proof system for Entropy Difference
(ED). In presenting the proof system, we will use two sub-
protocols due to Okamoto [20], which we will describe in
Section 4.
In Section 3.1, we give an overview of the proof system.
In particular, as a motivation we start by treating a special
case of
E
D in which all distributions are “ﬂat” (i.e., uniform
oversome subset of their range). We concludethe overview
by discussion of the ideas underlying the extension of this
special case to the general one. In Section 3.2, we discuss
a standard technique for “ﬂattening” distributions, which is
anessentialpartoftheﬁnalproofsystem. InSection3.3,we
state the propertiesof Okamoto’ssubprotocolsthat are used
in the proof system for
E
D; the actual description of these
subprotocols and their proofs of correctness are deferred to
Section 4. Finally, in Section 3.4, we give the proof system
for
E
D and prove its correctness.3.1 Overview
We begin with an exposition of the standard protocol
for proving lower bounds on set sizes, which is the start-
ing point for our proof system. We stress that all protocols
described in this section (as well as in the rest of the paper)
are public-coin protocols.
3.1.1 The standard lower bound protocol
Suppose
S is some subset of
f
 
 
 
g
n and a prover
M
(“Merlin”) wants to convince a veriﬁer
A (“Arthur”) that
j
S
j
 
 
m. Assuming
A has oracle access to a procedure
which tests membership in
S, there is a simple public-coin
protocol which can be used to accomplish this task. The
protocol was ﬁrst described in [2, 17] and orginates with a
lemma of Sipser [25]. For every pair of integers
k and
 ,
let
H
k
 
  be a family of 2-universal hash functions mapping
f
 
 
 
g
k to
f
 
 
 
g
 .
Lower bound protocol
 
M
 
A
 , on input
n and
m (and
membership oracle for
S
 
f
 
 
 
g
n)
1.
A selects
h uniformly from
H
n
 
m and sends
h to
M.
2.
M selects
x uniformly from
S
 
h
 
 
 
 
  (if this inter-
section is nonempty) and sends
x to
A.
  If the inter-
section is empty,
M sends
f
a
i
l to
A.
3.
A accepts if both
h
 
x
 
 
  and
x
 
S and rejects
otherwise.
The best analysis of the above protocol was providedin [1].
Lemma 3.1 Completeness: If
j
S
j
 
 
k
 
 
m, then
A ac-
cepts with probability at least
 
 
 
 
k.
Soundness: If
j
S
j
 
 
 
k
 
 
m, thennomatterwhatstrategy
M uses,
A accepts with probability at most
 
 
k.
In fact, this protocol also has a sort of statistical zero-
knowledge property. The property holds with respect to the
inputs
n and
m, provided that
j
S
j
 
 
m and that one is
given a uniformly selected element of
S.
Lemma 3.2 (implicitin[20])Let
H bea2-universalfamily
of hash functions mapping a domain
D to a range
R. Let
S
be a subset of
D such that
j
R
j
 
 
 
j
S
j. Then the following
two distributions have statistical difference
 
 
 
 
 :
(A) Choose
h uniformly in
H, and
x uniformly in
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
S. Output
 
h
 
x
 .
 
(B) Choose
x uniformly in
S, and
h uniformly in
f
h
 
 
H
 
h
 
 
x
 
 
 
g. Output
 
h
 
x
 .
Think of
D
 
f
 
 
 
g
n,
R
 
f
 
 
 
g
m, and
 
 
 
m
 
j
S
j.
Then, Distribution (A) corresponds to
A’s view of the exe-
cution of the protocol and Distribution (B) provides a sim-
ulation with deviation (at most)
 
 
m
 
j
S
j
 
 
 
 
  for it.
 Here
  is a canonically ﬁxed element of
f
 
 
 
g
m.
  In case
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
 
  the output is deﬁned to be a special failure
symbol.
3.1.2 A simple case of
E
D
We now sketch how the above lower bound protocol can
be used to give a public-coin
H
V
S
Z
K proof system for a
simpliﬁed version of
E
D. We call a distribution
X ﬂat if
all strings in the support of
X have the same probability.
That is,
X is the uniform distribution on some subset of its
domain. The simplifying assumptions we make are that we
are working with a pair of distributions
X and
Y (encoded
by circuits which sample from them) such that
1.
X and
Y are both ﬂat.
2.
j
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
 
j
 
k, where
k is the “security param-
eter.”
Now, we want to give a statistical zero-knowledge protocol
by which
M can convince
A to accept if
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
 
 
k
and
M cannot convince
A to accept if
H
 
Y
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
k. Since
X and
Y are ﬂat, they are uniform over subsets
S
X and
S
Y of their domain. By the deﬁnition of entropy,
j
S
X
j
 
 
H
 
X
  and
j
S
Y
j
 
 
H
 
Y
 . So provingthat
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
  is equivalent to proving that
j
S
X
j
 
j
S
Y
j. So, one
approach would be to use the above lower bound protocol
to prove a lower bound on
j
S
X
j, and use an upper bound
protocolwith similar properties(cf.,[10]) to provean upper
bound on
j
S
Y
j. Note that this by itself would do for placing
the simpliﬁed version of ED in
A
M (and similar ideas can
be applied to the general version ED; see
x3.1.3).
The problem with the above is that it requires the prover
to reveal
H
 
X
  and
H
 
Y
  (or approximations of these
quantities). In fact, the zero-knowledge properties asserted
above are relative to the given/asserted lower bound, and
do not seem to hold when the bound is not given. Indeed,
there seems to be no efﬁcient way for the veriﬁer to approx-
imate the size of
S, even when given a membership ora-
cle to
S. To overcome this difﬁculty, we adopt a technique
of Okamoto [20] (which he calls “complementary usage of
messages”).
Recall that we are given a circuit (which we also denote
Y ) which samples from
Y , and let
m denote the length of
the input to this circuit. So, for any point
y in the support
of
Y , we let
 
Y
 
y
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
m denote the set of inputs
to the circuit which yield output
y. Then,
P
r
 
Y
 
y
 
 
 
 
m
 
j
 
Y
 
y
 
j. Since
Y is ﬂat, we have
j
 
Y
 
y
 
j
 
 
m
 
P
r
 
Y
 
y
 
 
 
 
m
 
 
 
H
 
Y
  if
y
 
S
Y .
  otherwise.
Thus, proving an upper bound on
H
 
Y
  is equivalent to
proving a lower bound on
 
Y
 
y
  for any
y in the support
of
Y .
The key observation is that for any
y
 
S
Y ,
j
S
X
 
 
Y
 
y
 
j
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
m
 
H
 
Y
 . Soprovingthat
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
 
(which was our original goal) is equivalent to proving that
j
S
X
 
 
Y
 
y
 
j
 
 
m. Now we’ve reduced the problemto proving a lower bound for a set size which we know
(namely
 
m, which can be computed by just looking at the
circuit which computes
Y )! This gives rise to the following
“zero-knowledge”protocol.
Proof system
 
M
 
A
  for simple case of
E
D, on input
 
X
 
Y
 
Let
m denote the input length of
Y , and
n denote the output
length of
X.
1.
M selects
y distributed according to
Y and sends
y to
A.
2.
A selects a hash function
h uniformly from
H
n
 
m
 
m
and sends
h to
M.
3.
M selects
 
x
 
r
  uniformly from
 
S
X
 
 
Y
 
y
 
 
 
h
 
 
 
 
  and sends
 
x
 
r
  to
A.
4.
A checks that
Y
 
r
 
 
y and that
h
 
x
 
r
 
 
 . If either
does not hold,
A rejects immediately and the protocol
ends.
5.
M selects
q uniformly from
 
X
 
x
  and sends
q to
A.
6.
A checks that
X
 
q
 
 
x and accepts if this holds and
rejects otherwise.
The last two steps in the above protocol are for
M to prove
that
x is in fact in the supportof
X. Now it followsimmedi-
ately from our earlier discussion and the completeness and
soundness of the lower bound protocol that this protocol is
also complete and sound.
1. Completeness: If
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
 
 
k and
X and
Y
are both ﬂat, then
A accepts with probability at least
 
 
 
 
k.
2. Soundness: If
H
 
Y
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
k and
X and
Y are
both ﬂat, then no matter what strategy
M uses,
A ac-
cepts with probability at most
 
 
k.
Thestatisticalzero-knowledgepropertyofthisproofsystem
also follows readily from that of the lower bound protocol.
Consider the following simulator:
Simulator for simpliﬁed
E
D proof system, on input
 
X
 
Y
 
1. Choose
q and
r uniformlyatrandomandlet
x
 
X
 
q
 ,
y
 
Y
 
r
 .
2. Choose
h uniformly from
f
h
 
H
n
 
m
 
m
 
h
 
x
 
r
 
 
 
g.
3. Output
 
y
 
h
 
 
x
 
r
 
 
q
 .
The deviation of this simulator can be analyzed as follows:
The string
y is clearly distributed identically in both the
proof system and the simulator. In the simulator, con-
ditioned on
y, the pair
 
x
 
r
  is selected uniformly from
S
X
 
 
Y
 
y
 , and then
h is selected uniformlyamong those
that map
 
x
 
r
  to
 . In the protocol, conditioned on
y,
the function
h is selected uniformly in
H
n
 
m
 
m and then
 
x
 
r
  is selected uniformly from
 
S
X
 
 
Y
 
y
 
 
 
h
 
 
 
 
 .
Thus, by Lemma 3.2, it follows that if
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
 
 
k (i.e.,
j
S
X
 
 
Y
 
y
 
j
 
 
m
 
k), then the distributions
on
 
y
 
h
 
 
x
 
r
 
  in the simulator and the proof system
have statistical difference
 
 
 
 
k
 . Finally, conditioned on
 
y
 
h
 
 
x
 
r
 
 , the string
q is selected uniformlyfrom
 
X
 
x
 
in both distributions, and so it does not increase the statisti-
cal difference.
3.1.3 Treating general instances of
E
D
There are several problems in generalizing the proof sys-
tem of
x3.1.2 to arbitrary instances of
E
D. Clearly, the
simplifying assumptions we made will not hold in gen-
eral. The assumption that
j
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
 
j
 
k is easy
to achieve. If we let
X
  (resp.,
Y
 ) consist of
k indepen-
dent copies of
X (resp.,
Y ), then
H
 
X
 
 
 
k
 
H
 
X
  (resp.,
H
 
Y
 
 
 
k
 
H
 
Y
 ). So, the difference in entropies is mul-
tiplied by
k.
The assumptionthat
X and
Y are bothﬂat presentsmore
serious difﬁculties. As we will see, taking many inde-
pendent copies of each distribution yields distributions that
are “nearly ﬂat” (in a sense to be made precise later), but
the protocol still needs further modiﬁcation to work with
“nearly ﬂat” rather than truly ﬂat distributions. The ﬁrst
problem is that if
Y is only nearly ﬂat, then
M may select
y
to be “too heavy” (i.e.,
y has probability much greater than
 
 
H
 
Y
 ), allowing him too many choices for
r and leading
to violation of the soundness property. Similarly, although
there are only about
 
H
 
X
  choicesfor
x that have probabil-
ity near
 
 
H
 
X
 , if
X is only nearly ﬂat, there may be many
more choices for
x (alas these are “too light” – i.e., have
probability much smaller than
 
 
H
 
X
 ). This too gives
M
too much freedom (this time in choice of
x) and may lead
to violation of the soundness property.
In order to solve these problems, we use two subproto-
cols of Okamoto [20]: The ﬁrst is a “sample generation”
protocol, which is a protocol for
M and
A to select a sam-
plefromanearlyﬂatdistribution
Y suchthatnomatterwhat
strategy
M uses, the sample will not be too heavy. This will
replace Step 1 in the proof system of
x3.1.2, and guarantee
that
M does not have too much freedom in its choice of
r
(in Step 3). The second protocolis a “sample test” protocol,
which is a way for
M to prove that a sample
x taken from a
nearly ﬂat distribution
X is not too light. This will replace
Steps 5 and 6 in the proof system of
x3.1.2, and guarantee
that
M does not have too much freedom in its choice of
x
(in Step 3).
We stress that both of these subprotocols will be public-
coin and will possess appropriate simulability properties to
ensure that the resulting protocol for
E
D is a public-coin
H
V
S
Z
K proof system. In the rest of this section, we willspecify the properties of these subprotocols, and formulate
and analyze the proof system for
E
D assuming that these
subprotocolsexist. In Section 4, we present these subproto-
cols and prove that they have the asserted properties.
3.2 Flattening distributions
As a preliminary step towards treating the general in-
stances of
E
D, we formulate the process of “ﬂattening” dis-
tributions (i.e., making them “nearly ﬂat” by taking many
independent copies).
Deﬁnition 3.3 (heavy, light and typical elements): Let
X
be a distribution,
x an element possibly in its support, and
  a positive real number. We say that
x is
 -heavy (resp.,
 -light)if
P
r
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
X
  (resp.,
P
r
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
X
 ). Otherwise, we say that
x is
 -typical.
A natural relaxed deﬁnition of ﬂatness follows. The def-
inition links the amount of slackness allowed in “typical”
elements with the probability mass assigned to non-typical
elements.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (ﬂat distributions): A distribution
X is
called
 -ﬂat if for every
t
 
  the probability that an ele-
ment chosen from
X is
t
 
 -typical is at least
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
 .
By straightforwardapplication of HoeffdingInequality (cf.,
Appendix C), we have
Lemma 3.5 (ﬂattening lemma): Let
X be a distribution,
k
a positive integer, and
 
k
X denote the distribution com-
posed of
k independent copies of
X. Suppose that for all
x
in the support of
X it holds that
P
r
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
 
m. Then
 
k
X is
p
k
 
m-ﬂat.
The key point is that the entropy of
 
k
X grows linearly
with
k, whereas its deviation from ﬂatness grows signiﬁ-
cantly more slowy (i.e., linear in
p
k) as a function of
k.
3.3 Subprotocol speciﬁcations
Below (as above), all distributions are given in form of
a circuit which generate them. The input to these protocols
will consist of a distribution, denoted
X. We will denote
by
m (resp.,
n) the length of the input to (resp., output of)
the circuit generating the distribution
X. In all protocols
party
A is required to run in polynomial-time (in length of
the common input), which means in particular that the total
number of bits exchanged in the interaction is so bounded.
Deﬁnition 3.6 (Sample Generation Protocol): A public-
coin protocol
 
M
 
A
  is called a sample generation pro-
tocol if on common input a distribution
X and parameters
 
 
t, such that
X is
 -ﬂat and
t
 
 ,
  the following holds:
 The condition
t
 
  is to simplify the error expressions and will
always be satisﬁed in our applications.
1. (“completeness”): If both parties are honest then
A’s
output will be
t
 
 -typical with probability at least
 
 
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 .
2. (“soundness”): If
A is honest then, no matter how
M
plays,
A’s output is
 
p
t
 
 
 -heavy with probability
at most
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 . (
A may abort with no output.
 
 )
3. (strong“zero-knowledge”): There exists a polynomial-
time simulator
S so that for every
 
X
 
 
 
t
  as above,
the following two distributions have statistical differ-
ence at most
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 :
(A) Execute
 
M
 
A
  on common input
 
X
 
 
 
t
  and
output the view of
A, appended by
A’s output.
(B) Choose
x
 
X and output
 
S
 
 
X
 
 
 
t
 
 
x
 
 
x
 .
The above zero-knowledge property is referred to as
strong since the simulator cannot produce a view-output
pair by ﬁrst generating the view and then computing the
corresponding output. Instead, the simulator is forced (by
the explicit inclusion of
x in Distribution (B)) to generate a
consistent random view for a given random output (of
A).
We comment that the trivial protocol in which
A uniformly
selects an input
r to the circuit
X and reveals both
r and
the output
x
 
X
 
r
  cannot be used since the simulator is
only given
x and it may be difﬁcult to ﬁnd an
r yielding
x
in general. Still, a Sample Generation protocol is implicit
in Okamoto’s work [20] (where it is called a “Pre-test”).
Theorem 3.7 (implicit in [20]) There exists a public-coin
sample generation protocol. Furthermore, the number of
communication rounds in the protocol is linear in
q.
A proof of Theorem 3.7 is presented in Section 4.
Deﬁnition 3.8 (Sample Test Protocol): A public-coin pro-
tocol
 
M
 
A
  is called a sample test protocolif oncommon
inputa distribution
X, a string
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
n and parameters
 
 
t, such that
X is
 -ﬂat and
t
 
 ,the following holds:
1. (“completeness”): If both parties are honest and
x is
t
 
 -typical then
A accepts with probability at least
 
 
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 .
2. (“soundness”): If
x is
 
p
t
 
 
 -light and
A is honest
then, no matter how
M plays,
A accepts with proba-
bility at most
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 .
3. (weak “zero-knowledge”): There exists a polynomial-
time simulator
S so that for every
 
X
 
 
 
t
  as above
and for every
t
 
 -typical
x, the following two distri-
butions have statistical difference at most
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 :
(A) Execute
 
M
 
A
  on common input
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
t
 
and output the view of
A, prepended by
x.
(B) On input
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
t
  and an auxiliary in-
put
r uniformly distributed in
 
X
 
x
 , output
 
x
 
S
 
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
t
 
 
r
 
 .
 
  It will indeed do so if detecting cheating.The above zero-knowledge property is referred to as weak
since the simulator gets a random
r giving rise to
x (i.e.,
x
 
X
 
r
 ) as an auxiliary input (whereas
A is only given
x). We comment that a simple public-coin testing protocol
exists in case one can approximate the size of
 
X
 
x
  and
uniformly sample from it. However, this may not be the
case in general. Still, a Sample Testing protocol is implicit
in Okamoto’s work [20] (where it is called a “Post-test”).
Theorem 3.9 (implicit in [20]) There exists a public-coin
sample testing protocol. Furthermore, the number of com-
munication rounds in the protocol is linear in
q.
A proof of Theorem 3.9 is presented in Section 4.
3.4 The protocol for
E
D
We assume, without loss of generality, that the number
of input (resp., output) bits of
X equals the number for
Y
(e.g., by augmenting one circuit by dummy input or out-
put bits). Let
m and
n denote the corresponding quantities.
Furthermore, let
s denote the total length of the descrip-
tion of both
X and
Y . The ﬁrst step in the following pro-
tocol is an “ampliﬁcation step” which yields distributions
which are adequately ﬂat. The protocol uses subprotocols
for Sample Generation and Sample Testing as guaranteed
by Theorems 3.7 and 3.9, respectively.
Proof system
 
M
 
A
  for
E
D, on input
 
X
 
Y
 
1. Both
A and
M set
V
 
 
k
X and
W
 
 
k
Y , where
k
d
e
f
 
 
 
 
 
m
 
 
s.
2. The parties utilize a Sample Generation protocol, with
inputs
 
W
 
p
k
 
m
 
p
s
 , obtaining an output denoted
w.
3. Party
A uniformly selects
h
 
H
k
n
 
k
m
 
k
m, and sends
it to
M.
4.
M selects
 
v
 
r
  from the distribution
V
 
 
W
 
w
 
 
 
conditioned on
h
 
v
 
r
 
 
 , and sends
 
v
 
r
  to
A.
5.
A checks that
W
 
r
 
 
w and that
h
 
v
 
r
 
 
 . If ei-
ther does not hold,
A rejects immediately and the pro-
tocol ends.
6. The parties utilize a Sample Test protocol, with inputs
 
V
 
v
 
p
k
 
m
 
p
s
 , and
A accepts iff the test was con-
cluded satisfactorily.
We ﬁrst show that the ampliﬁcation step (i.e., Step 1) is in-
deed appropriate. That is,
Fact 3.10 Distributions
V and
W are
p
k
 
m-ﬂat.
 
 Here, and in the rest of the paper, we write use the same notation for a
set (e.g.,
 
W
 
w
 ) and the uniform distribution on that set.
Fact 3.10 is immediate by Lemma 3.5 and the setting of the
parameters. Given Fact 3.10, we turn to the essence of the
analysis of the protocol. The completeness property of the
protocol will follow from the zero-knowledge one, and so
we start by establishing the soundness property.
Lemma 3.11 (soundness): Suppose that
H
 
Y
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
 . Then
A accepts with probability at most
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
s
 
 .
Proof: By the hypothesis we have
H
 
W
 
 
H
 
V
 
 
k.
By Fact 3.10, both distributions are
 -ﬂat, with
 
 
p
k
 
m
 
 
 
m
 
p
s. Observe that the Sample Generation and
Testing subprotocols are invoked with parameters
t
 
p
s
and
 
 
p
k
 
m. Thus, the soundness condition of the
Sample Generation protocol implies that with probability at
most
k
m
 
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
s
 
  the outcome,
w, is
 
p
t
 
 
 -heavy.
Suppose that
w is not
 
p
t
 
 
 -heavy. Then we claim
that
M will be forced to select a
v that is
 
p
t
 
 
 -light
with probability at least
 
 
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
s
 
 . By Lemma 3.1,
it sufﬁces to show that the number of pairs
 
v
 
r
  such that
W
 
r
 
 
w and
v is not
 
p
t
 
 
 -light is at most
 
 
 
 
s
 
 
 
k
m. Since
w is not
 
p
t
 
 
 -heavy, there are at most
 
k
m
 
H
 
W
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
  values of
r such that
W
 
r
 
 
w. In
addition, the number of non-
 
p
t
 
 
 -light choices for
v
is at most
 
H
 
V
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
  (as each such
v has probability at
least
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
V
  under
V ). Thus, the total number
of pairs
 
v
 
r
  such that
W
 
r
 
 
w and
v is not
 
p
t
 
 
 -
light is at most
 
k
m
 
H
 
W
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
V
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
 
H
 
V
 
 
H
 
W
 
 
 
k
m
 
However, by our hypothesis and our setting of parame-
ters
 
p
t
 
 
 
 
H
 
V
 
 
H
 
W
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
 
k
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
m
 
s
 
 
s
 
Thus, by Lemma 3.1, the probability that
M can return
a suitable non-
 
p
t
 
 
 -light
v in Step 4 is at most
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
s
 
 . On the other hand, if
M returns a
 
p
t
 
 
 -
light
v then the probability that it will be accepted by the
Sample Test is at most
k
m
 
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
s
 
 .
The claim follows.
Simulator for the above protocol, on input
 
X
 
Y
 
1. Set
V
 
 
k
X and
W
 
 
k
Y , where
k
d
e
f
 
 
 
 
 
m
 
 
s.
2. Select uniformly
r
 
 
r
 
f
 
 
 
g
k
m, and let
v
 
V
 
r
 
 
and
w
 
W
 
r
 .3. Simulate an execution of the Sample Generation pro-
tocol on input
 
 
W
 
p
k
 
m
 
p
s
 
 
w
 , obtaining a view,
denoted
 , ending with output
w.
4. Party
A uniformly selects
h
 
H
k
n
 
k
m
 
k
m so that
h
 
v
 
r
 
 
 .
 
 
5. Simulate an execution of the Sample Generation pro-
tocol on input
 
V
 
v
 
p
k
 
m
 
p
s
  and auxiliary input
r
 , obtaining a view, denoted
 .
6. Output
 
 
 
 
w
 
 
h
 
 
v
 
r
 
 
 
 .
The correctness of this simulator will rely on the follow-
ingvariantof the LeftoverHash Lemma [18], provedin Ap-
pendix D.
Lemma 3.12 (implicit in [20]) Let
H be a 2-universalfam-
ily of hash functions mapping a domain
D to a range
R
and let
  be any ﬁxed element of
R. Let
Z be a distribution
on
D such that with probability
 
 
  over
z selected ac-
cording to
Z,
P
r
 
Z
 
z
 
 
 
 
j
R
j. Then the following two
distributions have statistical difference at most
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 :
(A) Choose
h uniformly in
H. Select
z according to
Z
conditioned on
h
 
z
 
 
 . Output
 
h
 
z
 .
(B) Choose
z according to
Z. Select
h uniformly in
f
h
 
 
H
 
h
 
z
 
 
 
g. Output
 
h
 
z
 .
Lemma 3.13 (zero-knowledge and completeness): Sup-
pose that
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
 
 
 . Then the statistical dif-
ference between the view of the veriﬁer on common input
 
X
 
Y
  and the output of the simulator on input
 
X
 
Y
  is
at most
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
s
 
 . Furthermore, with probabilityat least
 
 
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
s
 
 , the simulatorgeneratesanacceptingtran-
script, andso intherealinteractiontheveriﬁeracceptswith
probability at least
 
 
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
s
 
 .
Proof: Analogously to the proof of Lemma 3.11, we note
that both
V and
W are
 -ﬂat, for
 
 
 
 
m
 
p
s, and we
have
H
 
V
 
 
H
 
W
 
 
k.
By the strong zero-knowledge property of the Sample
Generation protocol, the pair
 
 
 
w
  in the output of the
simulator has statistical difference at most
k
m
 
 
 
 
 
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
  from a real execution of that protocol. Since
W
is
 -ﬂat, the string
w is
t
 -light with probability at most
 
 
 
 
s
  in the simulator. Thus, we consider the distributions
on
 
h
 
 
v
 
r
 
  conditioned on any pair
 
 
 
w
  such that
w is
not
t
 -light. To analyze this, we apply Lemma 3.12 with
Z
 
V
 
 
W
 
w
 ,
D
 
f
 
 
 
g
k
n
 
k
m, and
R
 
f
 
 
 
g
k
m.
Distribution (A) (resp., (B)) in Lemma 3.12 corresponds
to the distribution of
 
h
 
 
v
 
r
 
  in the proof system (resp.,
simulator). Since
V is
 -ﬂat, the following holds with
 
 This step can be efﬁciently implemented for all popular constructions
of 2-universal families (e.g., the linear transformations family). Also note
that by the 2-universal property of such families, functions mapping any
ﬁxed string to
  always exist.
probability
 
 
 
 
 
s
 
  over
 
v
 
r
  selected according to
V
 
 
W
 
w
 :
P
r
 
V
 
 
W
 
w
 
 
 
v
 
r
 
 
 
P
r
 
V
 
v
 
 
 
j
 
W
 
w
 
j
 
 
 
H
 
V
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
k
m
 
H
 
W
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
k
 
 
t
 
j
R
j
 
 
 
 
1
6
m
6
s
 
 
 
 
8
m
4
s
j
R
j
 
 
 
s
j
R
j
Thus, we can take
 
 
 
 
s
 
  and
 
 
 
 
s in Lemma 3.12,
and see that the two distributions on
 
h
 
 
v
 
r
 
  have statis-
tical difference
 
 
 
 
s
  (conditioned on history
 
 
 
w
 ). Fi-
nally,including
  onlyincreasesthestatistical differenceby
 
 
 
 
s
  by the weak zero-knowledgepropertyof the Sample
Test protocol(notingthatinthe simulator,
v is
t
 -lightwith
probability at most
 
 
s
 
  and
r is distributed uniformly in
 
V
 
v
 ).
Lemmas 3.11 and 3.13 and the fact that the given proof
systemis publiccoinimmediatelyimplyTheorem1.8. The-
orem 1.4 then follows as a special case. Actually, we can
strengthen Theorem 1.8 somewhat by applying a transfor-
mation of [11] which converts public-coin honest-veriﬁer
statistical zero-knowledge proofs into ones with perfect
completeness (i.e., the veriﬁer accepts with probability 1
on
y
e
s instances). Their transformation also preserves an
exponentially small soundness error and an exponentially
small simulator deviation. Thus, we obtain:
Corollary 3.14 ED has a public-coin proof system which
has perfect completeness and exponentially small sound-
ness error, and can be simulated with exponentially van-
ishing deviation.
4 The Sample Generation and Test Protocols
In this section, we present Okamoto’s protocols for gen-
erating and testing samples from a nearly ﬂat distribution.
Recall that these protocols must be public coin and further-
more must satisfy certain “zero-knowledge”properties.
4.1 Overview
Sample Generation. Here the input to the protocol
 
M
 
A
  is a
 -ﬂat distribution
X (encodedby a circuit) and
the output should be a sample
x from this distribution. We
require that, no matter what strategy
M follows,
x will notbe too heavy. If, however, both parties play honestly, then
x should be nearly typical with high probability,and should
be simulatable for an externally speciﬁed
x. In particular,
the protocol should not reveal an input to the circuit
X that
yields
x, as the simulator is onlygiven
x and it may be difﬁ-
cult to ﬁnd an input yielding
x in general. If we removethis
condition, the problem becomes trivial:
A could just sam-
ple
x according to
X and reveal both
x and the input used
to produceit. Since
X is nearly ﬂat,
x will be nearly typical
with high probability.
Okamoto’s solution to this problem has the following
general structure:
M proposes a sample
x (which is sup-
posed to be distributed according to
X) and sends it to
A.
(Of course, if
M is dishonest, he can choose
x to be too
heavy.) Then
M and
A engage in a short “game” which
ends by
M proposing another sample
x
 . Roughly speak-
ing, this game has the following properties:
1. If
x is too heavy, then no matter what strategy
M fol-
lows, he will be forced to select
x
  which is noticeably
lighter than
x.
2. If
x is not too heavy, then no matter what strategy
M
follows, he will be forced to choose
x
  that is also not
too heavy.
3. If
x isnearlytypicaland
M playshonestly,then
x
  will
also be nearly typical.
4. If
M plays honestly, then
A’s view of the game is sim-
ulatable for an externally speciﬁed
x
 .
Clearly, repeating this game many times to obtain a se-
quence of samples
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
x
m (where
x
  is proposedby
M
and
x
i
 
 
 
x
 
i) will have the effect of pushing a heavy pro-
posal for
x
  closer and closer to the nearly typical set. Tak-
ing
msufﬁcientlylarge(butstillpolynomialintheappropri-
ate parameters),
x
m will be guaranteed to be not too heavy,
no matter how
M plays. On the other hand, if
M plays
honestly, all the samples will be nearly typical. Finally, the
simulability property of the game enables the entire Sam-
ple Generation protocol to be simulated “backwards” for an
externally speciﬁed
x
m.
Sample Test. Here the input to the protcol
 
M
 
A
  is a
 -ﬂat distribution
X (encoded by a circuit) together with
a string
x from the domain of
X. At the end of the proto-
col,
A accepts or rejects. We require that if
x is too light,
A should reject with high probabability. If, however,
x is
nearly typical and both parties play honestly, then
A should
accept with high probability, and, moreover,
A’s view of
the interaction should be simulatable (given additionally a
random input for
X which yields
x).
The general structure of this protocol is very similar to
that of the Sample Generation protocol. Given
x,
M and
A
engagein a shortgame whichendsby
M proposinganother
sample
x
 . Roughly speaking, this game has the following
properties:
1. If
x is too light, then no matter what strategy
M fol-
lows, he will be forced to select
x
  which is noticeably
lighter than
x.
2. If
x is nearlytypicaland
M playshonestly,then
x
  will
also be nearly typical.
3. Ifbothpartiesplayhonestly,then
A’s viewofthegame
issimulatable(givena randominputto
X whichyields
x).
Clearly, repeating this game many times to obtain a se-
quence
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
x
m (where
x
 
 
x and
x
i
 
 
 
x
 
i) will
have the effect of making a light input sample lighter and
lighter. Taking
m sufﬁciently large,
x
m
 
  will be so light
that it has zero probability, so there is no
x
m lighter than
x
m
 
  and
A will reject! Notice that we do not care what
happens in the pushing game if
x
i is not too light and
M
plays dishonestly; if the original input is too light (which is
the the only time we worry about a dishonest
M), all the
subsequent
x
i’s will also be too light with high probability.
On the other hand, if the original input
x is nearly typical
and
M plays honestly, all the samples will be nearly typi-
cal. Finally, the simulability property of the game enables
the entire Sample Generation protocol to be simulated “for-
wards” given coins for
x. Amazingly, the game used for
the Sample Test protocol is identical to the game used for
the Sample Generation protocol. We describe this “push-
ing” game in the next section, and subsequentlygive formal
descriptions of the two protocols.
4.2 The pushing game
ThroughouttheremainderofSection4,
X isa
 -ﬂatdis-
tribution encoded by a circuit and
m (resp.,
n) denotes the
length of the input (resp., output) of the circuit generating
X. Recall that for positive integers
k and
 ,
H
k
 
  denotes
a 2-universal family of hash functions mapping
f
 
 
 
g
k to
f
 
 
 
g
 .
The basic game underlying the Sample Generation and
Sample Test protocols is the following 1-round protocol
(called “sequentially recursive hashing” in [20]):
Pushing game
 
M
 
A
 , on input
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
t
 , where
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
n and
t
 
 
1.
A chooses
h uniformly from
H
m
 
n
 
m
 
 
t
  and sends
h to
M.
2.
M chooses
 
r
 
x
 
  from the distribution
 
X
 
x
 
 
X,
conditionedon
h
 
r
 
x
 
 
 
 , and sends
 
r
 
x
 
  to
A. (If
there is no such pair
 
r
 
x
 
 , then
M sends
f
a
i
l to
A.)3.
A checks that
X
 
r
 
 
x and
h
 
r
 
x
 
 
 
 . If both
conditions hold,
A outputs
x
 . Otherwise
A rejects.
Observe that if
j
 
X
 
x
 
j
 
 , then
A rejects with proba-
bility 1. In order to describe remaining the properties of the
pushing game, we deﬁne the weight of a string
x relative to
a circuit
X by
w
t
X
 
x
 
 
l
o
g
 
P
r
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
H
 
X
 
 . So,
x is
 -heavy iff
w
t
X
 
x
 
 
  and
x is
 -light iff
w
t
X
 
x
 
 
 
 .
Also note that for
x in the support of
X,
j
w
t
X
 
x
 
j
 
m.
When the distribution
X is clear from the context, we will
often write
w
t
 
x
  instead of
w
t
X
 
x
 . The followinglemma
asserts that no matter how
M plays, if the input to the game
is atypical, then the output is noticeably lighter. (The be-
havior on typical inputs is analyzed later — in Lemma 4.2.)
Lemma 4.1 If
A follows the prescribed strategy in the
pushing game, then no matter what strategy
M uses, the
following hold:
1. (“heavy gets lighter”) With probability
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 ,
either
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
m
a
x
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
  or
A rejects.
2. (“lightgetslighter”)If
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 , thenwith
probability
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 , either
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
or
A rejects.
Proof: 1. Let
S be the set of
x
  such that
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
m
a
x
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
 . We need to show that with
probability at most
 
 
 
 
t
2
  over the choice of
h from
H
m
 
n
 
m
 
 
t
 , there exists a pair
 
r
 
x
 
 
 
 
X
 
x
 
 
S such
that
h
 
x
 
r
 
 
 
 . By the soundness of the standard lower-
bound protocol (Lemma 3.2), it sufﬁces to prove that
j
 
X
 
x
 
 
S
j
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
 
 
m
 
 
t
 
 
The intuition is that the number of
x
  that are heavier than
m
a
x
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
  is so small that not even the size
of
 
X
 
x
  can compensate.
By deﬁnition of
w
t
 
x
 ,
j
 
X
 
x
 
j
 
 
m
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 . We
now bound
j
S
j. First, since
X is
 -ﬂat, we have
 
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
P
r
x
0
 
X
h
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
i
 
P
r
 
X
 
S
 
 
X
x
0
 
S
P
r
 
X
 
x
 
 
On the other hand, every
x
 
 
S is
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 -heavy, so
P
r
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 . Thus,
 
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
j
S
j
 
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
Putting everything together, we have
j
 
X
 
x
 
 
S
j
 
 
m
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
m
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
 
 
 
m
 
 
t
 
 
as desired. (In the last inequality, we used the fact that
t
 
 .)
2. Let
S
 
f
x
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
g. Again, it sufﬁces
to show that
j
 
X
 
x
 
 
S
j
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
 
 
m
 
 
t
 . Here the
intuition is that
j
 
X
 
x
 
j is so small (since
x is so light) that
the only way for
M to succeed is to choose
x
  even lighter
than
x (since there cannot be too many strings of noticeable
probability mass). This time we bound
j
S
j by dividing
S
into two parts. Deﬁne
S
 
 
f
x
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
g
S
 
 
f
x
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
g
 
so that
S
 
S
 
 
S
 . Since every
x
 
 
S
  has probability
mass greater than
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 , we must have
j
S
 
j
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
t
 
 
where the last inequalityfollowsfrom
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
and
 
 
t. We now bound
j
S
 
j. Since
X is
 -ﬂat, we have
 
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
P
r
 
X
 
 
S
 
 
 
j
S
 
j
 
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
Thus,
j
S
 
j
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
t
 
 
 , and so
j
S
j
 
j
S
 
j
 
j
S
 
j
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
and
j
 
X
 
x
 
 
S
j
 
 
m
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
 
m
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
 
 
 
m
 
 
t
 
 
as desired.
Thepushinggamehasthe followingsimulability and“com-
pleteness” properties when both parties are honest:
Lemma 4.2 If both parties follow the protocol in the push-
ing game and
x is
t
 -typical, then the following two distri-
butions have statistical difference at most
 
 
 
 
t
2
 :
(A) Execute the pushing game on input
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
t
  to
obtain
 
h
 
r
 
x
 
 . Output
 
h
 
r
 
x
 
 .
(B) Let
x
  be distributed according to
X and let
r be
selected uniformly from
 
X
 
x
 . Choose
h uniformly
in
H
m
 
n
 
m
 
 
t
  subject to
h
 
r
 
x
 
 
 
 . Output
 
h
 
r
 
x
 
 .
Proof: We applyLemma3.12with
Z
 
 
X
 
x
 
 
X,
D
 
f
 
 
 
g
m
 
n and
R
 
f
 
 
 
g
m
 
 
t
 . Distribution (A) (resp.,
(B)) in Lemma 3.12 corresponds to Distribution (A) (resp.,(B)) above. Since
X is
 -ﬂat, the following holds with
probability
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
  over
 
r
 
x
 
  selected according to
 
X
 
x
 
 
X:
P
r
 
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
r
 
x
 
 
 
 
P
r
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
 
j
 
X
 
x
 
j
 
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
m
 
H
 
X
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
t
 
j
R
j
Thus, we can take
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
  and
 
 
 
 
t
 
 
 
 
t
2
in
Lemma 3.12, and see that the two distributions have statis-
tical difference
 
 
 
 
t
2
 .
4.3 The protocols
The sample generation and test protocols simply consist
of many repetitions of the basic pushing game:
Sample Generation Protocol
 
M
 
A
 , on input
 
X
 
 
 
t
 ,
where
t
 
 
1.
M selects
x
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
n according to
X and sends
x
 
to
A.
2. Repeat for
i from
  to
m:
M and
A execute the Push-
ing Game on input
 
X
 
x
i
 
 
 
 
 
t
  and let
x
i be the
output.
3.
A outputs
x
m unless it rejected in one of the Pushing
Games, in which case it rejects.
Sample Test Protocol
 
M
 
A
 , on input
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
t
 ,
where
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
n and
t
 
 
1. Let
x
 
 
x.
2. Repeat for
i from 1 to
m
 
 :
M and
A execute the
Pushing Game on input
 
X
 
x
i
 
 
 
 
 
t
  and let
x
i be
the output.
3.
A rejects if it rejected in any of the Pushing Games,
else it accepts.
4.4 Correctness of Sample Generation Protocol
Using the propertiesofthe PushingGame, we nowprove
that the Sample Generation Protocol satisﬁes Deﬁnition 3.6
and thus Theorem 3.7 holds.
Soundness. By Lemma 4.1 (Part 1) and induction, we
see that for every
 
 
i
 
m, with probability at least
 
 
i
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 , either
w
t
 
x
i
 
 
m
a
x
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
i
 
 
p
t
 
  or
A rejects. In particular,since
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
m, with probability
at least
 
 
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 , we have
w
t
 
x
m
 
 
m
a
x
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
m
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 
unless
A rejects, as desired.
Completeness and Zero-Knowledge. First we observe
that the completeness condition follows from the strong
zero-knowledge condition: In Distribution (B) of Deﬁni-
tion 3.6,
x is distributed according to
X, and hence is
t
 -
typical with probability
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
  by the
 -ﬂatness of
X. Since
x corresponds to the output of the Sample Gener-
ation protocol in Distribution (A) and Distributions (A) and
(B) have statistical difference at most
 
 
 
 
t
2
 , the output
of the Sample Generation Protocol must be
t
 -typical with
probability at least
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 .
Now we prove the zero-knowledge condition. Consider
the following probabilistic polynomial-time simulator:
Simulator for Sample Generation Protocol, on input
 
 
X
 
 
 
t
 
 
x
 
1. Let
x
m
 
x.
2. For
i from
m down to
  repeat:
(a) Choose
r
i
 
  uniformly from
f
 
 
 
g
m and let
x
i
 
 
 
X
 
r
i
 
 
 .
(b) Choose
h
i uniformly from
H
m
 
n
 
m
 
 
t
  subject
to
h
i
 
r
i
 
 
 
x
i
 
 
 .
3. Output
 
x
 
 
h
 
 
 
r
 
 
x
 
 
 
h
 
 
 
r
 
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
h
m
 
 
r
m
 
 
 
x
m
 
 
 
We prove by induction on
i that the distribution on
t
i
 
 
x
 
 
h
 
 
 
r
 
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
h
i
 
 
r
i
 
 
 
x
i
 
  in the output of
the simulator (when
x is chosen according to
X) has statis-
tical differenceat most
i
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
  from the veriﬁer’sview of
the Sample Generation protocol up to the end of the
i’th ex-
ecution of the Pushing Game. Clearly this is true for
i
 
 ,
as in both cases
x
  is distributed according to
X. Now sup-
pose it is true for
i; we will prove it for
i
 
 . From the
following two observationsit follows that the statistical dif-
ferenceonlyincreasesby
 
 
t
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
  when
going from
i to
i
 
 :
1. In the simulator,
x
i is
t
 -typical with probability at
least
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
 .
2. For any history
t
i
 
 
x
 
 
h
 
 
 
r
 
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
h
i
 
 
r
i
 
 
 
x
i
 
 
in which
x
i is
t
 -typical, the following two distribu-
tions have statistical difference
 
 
 
 
t
2
 :
(A)
A’s view of the
 
i
 
 
 ’st Pushing Game condi-
tioned on history
t
i.
(B) The distribution of
 
h
i
 
 
 
 
r
i
 
x
i
 
 
 
  condi-
tionedon history
t
i in the outputof the simulator.Observation 1 is immediate from the fact that
x
i is dis-
tributed according to
X in the simulator and
X is
 -ﬂat.
Observation2 followsfromLemma4.2, observingthat con-
ditioned on history
t
i, the triple
 
h
i
 
 
 
 
r
i
 
x
i
 
 
 
  in the
output of the simulator is selected exactly according to the
Distribution (B) in Lemma 4.2. That is, conditioned on
history
t
i,
r
i is selected uniformly from
 
X
 
x
i
 ,
x
i
 
  is
distributed according to
X, and
h is selected uniformly in
H
m
 
n
 
m
 
 
t
  subject to
h
 
r
i
 
x
i
 
 
 
 
 .
4.5 Correctness of Sample Test Protocol
Finally, we prove that the Sample Test Protocol satisﬁes
Deﬁnition 3.8 and thus Theorem 3.9 holds.
Soundness. By Lemma 4.1 (Part 2) and induction, we
see that if
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
 
p
t
 
 
 , then with probabil-
ity at least
 
 
i
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 , for every
 
 
i
 
m
 
 ,
w
t
 
x
i
 
 
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
i (or
A rejects). In particular, since
w
t
 
x
 
 
 
H
 
X
 , with probability at least
 
 
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 ,
wehave
w
t
 
x
m
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
munless
A rejectsat someiter-
ation. Since
m
 
H
 
X
 
 
w
t
 
x
m
 
 
l
o
g
j
 
X
 
x
m
 
j cannot
be negativeunless
j
 
X
 
x
m
 
j
 
 , it followsthat with prob-
ability at least
 
 
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 ,
A must reject in one of the
iterations.
CompletenessandZero-Knowledge. First we provethe
zero-knowledge condition. Consider the following proba-
bilistic polynomial-time simulator:
Simulator for Sample Test Protocol, on input
 
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
t
 
 
r
 
1. Let
x
 
 
x and
r
 
 
r.
2. For
i from
  to
m repeat:
(a) Choose
r
i uniformly from
f
 
 
 
g
m and let
x
i
 
X
 
r
i
 .
(b) Choose
h
i uniformly from
H
m
 
n
 
m
 
 
t
  subject
to
h
i
 
r
i
 
 
 
x
i
 
 
 .
3. Output
 
x
 
 
h
 
 
 
r
 
 
x
 
 
 
h
 
 
 
r
 
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
h
m
 
 
 
 
r
m
 
x
m
 
 
 
 
 
We prove by induction on
i that the distribution on
t
i
 
 
x
 
 
h
 
 
 
r
 
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
h
i
 
 
r
i
 
 
 
x
i
 
  in the output of
the simulator (when
r is selected uniformly from
 
X
 
x
 
and
x is
t
 -typical) has statistical difference at most
i
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
  from the veriﬁer’s view of the Sample Test proto-
col up to the end of the
i’th executionof the Pushing Game.
Clearly this is true for
i
 
 . The induction step is proved
analogously to the argument used for the Sample Genera-
tion Protocol, using the same two observations and noting
that, although the simulator works in reverse order, the se-
lection of
r
i and
h
i is as before.
Now we observethat the completenessconditionfollows
from the weak zero-knowledge condition and the particu-
lar simulator we have given above. Speciﬁcally, the above
simulator always outputs transcripts which would make
A
accept. Since it has statistical differenceat most
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
fromthe SampleTest protocol,
A mustacceptin the Sample
Test protocol with probability at least
 
 
m
 
 
 
 
 
t
2
 .
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A The Aiello–Hastad Characterization –
Further Details
Proof of Lemma 2.2: For readability, we will omit
x in
the notation. For
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
 
r
  and
i
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r, we let
 
i
denote the
i
 
  preﬁx of
 . Then, by deﬁnition,
K
L
 
S
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
 
X
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
2
r
 
P
r
 
S
 
 
 
 
l
o
g
P
r
 
S
 
 
 
P
r
 
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
 
 
 
We can rewrite the fraction above as follows:
P
r
 
S
 
 
 
P
r
 
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
 
 
 
Q
 
r
i
 
 
P
r
 
S
i
 
 
i
j
S
i
 
 
 
 
i
 
 
 
Q
 
r
i
 
 
P
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h
P
S
 
V
i
i
 
 
i
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
i
 
 
 
 
i
 
 
 
 
Q
r
j
 
 
P
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S
 
j
 
 
 
j
j
S
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
j
 
 
 
Q
r
j
 
 
P
r
h
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
j
 
 
 
j
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
j
 
 
i
A key observationis that the denominatorin the abovefrac-
tion equals the reciprocal of the number of possible out-
comes of the veriﬁer coins (i.e.,
 
 
 ), since even-indexed
messages of
h
P
S
 
V
i are generated by
V exactly as in
h
P
 
V
i. Multiplying both the numerator and denominator
in the above fraction by
Q
r
j
 
 
P
r
 
S
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
j
 
 
 , we ob-
tain
P
r
 
S
 
 
 
P
r
 
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
 
 
 
Q
r
j
 
 
P
r
 
S
 
j
 
 
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
Q
r
j
 
 
P
r
 
S
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
j
 
 
 
 
and thus
K
L
 
S
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
 
 
 
r
X
j
 
 
X
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
2
r
 
P
r
 
S
 
 
 
 
l
o
g
P
r
 
S
 
j
 
 
 
j
 
r
X
j
 
 
X
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
2
r
 
P
r
 
S
 
 
 
 
l
o
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P
r
 
S
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
X
j
 
 
H
 
S
 
j
 
 
r
X
j
 
 
H
 
S
 
j
 
 
 
The lemma follows.Proof of Lemma 2.3: By Lemma 2.2,
K
L
 
S
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
 
 
 
 
r
X
i
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
 
 
H
 
S
i
 
 
 
 
 
r
X
i
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
 
 
H
 
h
P
 
V
i
i
 
 
 
r
X
i
 
 
j
H
 
S
i
 
 
H
 
h
P
 
V
i
i
 
j
Consider a perfect simulator (i.e., of zero deviation), de-
noted
S, for
 
P
 
V
 . Note that the simulator-based-prover
with respect to
S is
P itself. Thus, by Lemma 2.2,
 
 
 
r
X
i
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
 
 
H
 
h
P
 
V
i
i
 
 
 
 
 
r
X
i
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
 
 
H
 
S
i
 
 
K
L
 
S
j
h
P
 
V
i
 
 
 
Finally, we use the fact (cf., Appendix B) that for any two
randomvariables,
X and
Y , rangingoverdomain
D itholds
that
j
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
 
j
 
 
l
o
g
j
D
j
 
 
 
 
X
 
Y
 
 
H
 
 
 
 
X
 
Y
 
 
Combining all the above, we get
K
L
 
S
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
 
 
r
X
i
 
 
j
H
 
S
i
 
 
H
 
h
P
 
V
i
i
 
j
 
 
r
X
i
 
 
 
i
 
 
 
 
S
i
 
h
P
 
V
i
i
 
 
H
 
 
 
 
S
i
 
h
P
 
V
i
i
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
 
h
P
 
V
i
 
 
 
r
 
H
 
 
 
 
S
 
h
P
 
V
i
 
 
and the lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 2.4: For any random variables
X
and
Y and any function
f it holds that
K
L
 
X
j
Y
 
 
K
L
 
f
 
X
 
j
f
 
Y
 
  (cf., Appendix B). Letting
f
 
 
 
 
 
if
  is accepting and
f
 
 
 
 
  otherwise, we have
K
L
 
S
 
x
 
j
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
 
 
 
K
L
 
 
p
 
q
 
 
where
q
 
 
q equals the probability that
h
P
S
 
V
i
 
x
  ac-
cepts. Using the fact that
K
L
 
 
p
 
q
 
 
 
K
L
 
 
p
 
q
 , for any
q
 
 
q
 
p (cf., Appendix B), we are done.
B Statistical Inequalities
Fact B.1 For anytwo randomvariables,
X and
Y , ranging
over a domain
D it holds that
j
H
 
X
 
 
H
 
Y
 
j
 
l
o
g
 
j
D
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
 
 
 
where
 
d
e
f
 
 
 
X
 
Y
 .
This fact can be inferred from Fano’s Inequality (cf., [5,
Thm. 2.11.1]). A more direct proof follows.
Proof: Assume
 
 
  or else the claim is obvious. Let
p
 
x
 
d
e
f
 
P
r
 
X
 
x
  and
q
 
x
 
d
e
f
 
P
r
 
X
 
x
 . Deﬁne
m
 
x
 
d
e
f
 
m
i
n
f
p
 
x
 
 
q
 
x
 
g. Then
P
x
 
D
m
 
x
 
 
 
 
 .
Deﬁne random variables
Z
 ,
X
  and
Y
  so that
P
r
 
Z
 
 
x
 
 
m
 
 
x
 
d
e
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
m
 
x
 
P
r
 
X
 
 
x
 
 
p
 
 
x
 
d
e
f
 
 
 
 
 
p
 
x
 
 
m
 
x
 
 
P
r
 
Y
 
 
x
 
 
q
 
 
x
 
d
e
f
 
 
 
 
 
q
 
x
 
 
m
 
x
 
 
Thinkof
X (resp.,
Y )asbeinggeneratedbypicking
Z
  with
probability
 
 
  and
X
  (resp.,
Y
 ) otherwise. Then,
H
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
Z
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
 
H
 
 
 
 
H
 
Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
 
Z
 
 
Observing that
P
r
 
X
 
 
x
 
 
  on at least one
x
 
D, it
follows that
H
 
X
 
 
 
l
o
g
 
j
D
j
 
 
 , and the fact follows.
Comment: The above bound is tight. Let
e
 
D and
consider
X which is identically
e, and
Y which with proba-
bility
 
 
  equals
e and otherwise is uniform over
D
n
f
e
g.
Clearly,
 
 
X
 
Y
 
 
  and
H
 
Y
 
 
H
 
X
 
 
 
l
o
g
 
j
D
j
 
 
 
 
H
 
 
 
 
 
 .
Fact B.2 Foranyrandomvariables
X and
Y andanyfunc-
tion
f it holds that
K
L
 
X
j
Y
 
 
K
L
 
f
 
X
 
j
f
 
Y
 
 .
This fact can be easily inferred from the Log Sum Inequal-
ity (cf., [5, Thm. 2.7.1]). A more direct proof follows.
Proof: Expanding the deﬁnition of
K
L
 
X
j
Y
 , we get
K
L
 
X
j
Y
 
 
P
v
P
r
 
f
 
X
 
 
v
 
 
A
v, where
A
v
 
X
x
 
f
 
x
 
 
v
P
r
 
X
 
x
j
f
 
X
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l
o
g
P
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f
 
X
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P
r
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x
j
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P
r
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P
r
 
Y
 
x
j
f
 
Y
 
 
v
 
 
We can rewrite
A
v as
B
v
 
C
v, where
B
v
 
X
x
 
f
 
x
 
 
v
P
r
 
X
 
x
j
f
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l
o
g
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P
r
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v
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C
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X
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v
P
r
 
X
 
x
j
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l
o
g
P
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x
j
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P
r
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x
j
f
 
Y
 
 
v
 Now,
P
v
P
r
 
f
 
X
 
 
v
 
 
B
v equals
K
L
 
f
 
X
 
j
f
 
Y
 
 ,
whereas the equals
P
r
 
f
 
X
 
 
v
 
 
K
L
 
X
v
j
Y
v
 
 
 ,
where
X
v (resp.,
Y
v) denotes the residual distribution of
X conditioned on
f
 
X
 
 
v (resp.,
Y conditioned on
f
 
Y
 
 
v).
Comment: The above bound is in fact equivalent
to the Log Sum Inequality (i.e.,
P
i
a
i
l
o
g
 
a
i
 
b
i
 
 
 
P
i
a
i
 
l
o
g
 
P
i
a
i
 
P
i
b
i
 , for all non-negative
a
i’s and
b
i’s). To deduce to Log Sum Inequality from the above
bound, one may ﬁrst prove a special case in which
P
i
a
i
 
P
i
b
i
 
  (by deﬁning
X and
Y so that the
a
i’s and
b
i’s
represent their probability mass, and let
f be a constant
function). The general case is derived by easy manipula-
tion.
Fact B.3 For any
 
 
q
 
 
q
 
p
 
 , it holds that
K
L
 
 
p
 
q
 
 
 
K
L
 
 
p
 
q
 .
Proof: We use the fact (cf., [5, Thm. 2.7.2]) that for every
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  and
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q
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Picking
q
 
 
q
 ,
q
 
 
pand
  suchthat
 
q
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
q
 
 
q,
we have
K
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p
 
q
 
 
 
 
K
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p
 
q
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , and the
fact follows.
C Proof of the Flattening Lemma
For every
x in the support of
X, we let
w
 
x
 
 
 
l
o
g
P
r
 
X
 
x
 . Then
w maps the support of
X, denoted
D, to
 
 
 
m
 . Let
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
X
k be identical and independent
copies of
X. The lemma asserts that for every
t,
P
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
k
X
i
 
 
w
 
X
i
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H
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
 
m
p
k
 
 
 
 
t
2
 
 
Observe that
E
 
w
 
X
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P
x
P
r
 
X
 
x
 
w
 
x
 
 
H
 
X
 ,
for every
i. Thus, the lemma follows by a straightfor-
ward application of Hoeffding Inequality: Speciﬁcally, de-
ﬁne random variables
 
i
 
w
 
X
i
 , let
 
 
E
 
 
i
  and
 
 
t
m
 
p
k, and use
P
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
k
i
 
 
 
i
k
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
x
p
 
 
 
 
 
m
 
 
k
 
 
 
 
e
x
p
 
 
 
t
 
 
The lemma follows.
D Proof of the Hashing Lemma
We denote the two distributions on pairs
 
h
 
z
  in
Lemma 3.12 by
A
 
 
A
H
 
A
Z
  and
B
 
 
B
H
 
B
Z
 . By
thedeﬁnitionofstatistical difference,it sufﬁcestoshowthat
for every set
S
 
H
 
D,
P
r
 
A
 
S
 
 
P
r
 
B
 
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . In order to do this, we ﬁrst will argue that for
“most” pairs
 
h
 
z
 ,
P
r
 
A
 
 
h
 
z
 
  is not too much greater
than
P
r
 
B
 
 
h
 
z
 
 . Observe that both distributions
A and
B only output pairs
 
h
 
z
  such that
h
 
z
 
 
 . Now, for any
 
h
 
z
 
 
H
 
D such that
h
 
z
 
 
 , we have
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where the last equality follows from 2-universality.
Thus, showing that
P
r
 
A
 
 
h
 
z
 
  is not too much
greater than
P
r
 
B
 
 
h
 
z
 
  for most pairs
 
h
 
z
  amounts
to showing that for most
h,
P
w
 
h
￿
1
 
 
 
P
r
 
Z
 
w
  is
not too much smaller than
 
 
j
R
j. In order to prove a
lower bound on this sum (for most
h), we restrict the
sum to a slightly smaller set of
w’s. Let
L
 
f
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D
 
P
r
 
Z
 
w
 
 
 
 
j
R
j
g, so by hypothesis,
P
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 . For
w
 
D and
h
 
H, deﬁne indicator functions
 
w
 
h
 
 
n
  if
h
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  otherwise
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 . Thus,
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By 2-universality,for
h selected uniformlyin
H, the ran-
dom variables
f
 
w
 
h
 
g
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D each have mean
 
 
j
R
j and are
pairwise independent. Thus,
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 By Chebyshev’s inequality,
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Let
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f
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g be the
set “good”
h’s for which
f
 
h
  is not too much smaller than
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j. Then for every
z
 
D and
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P
r
 
A
 
 
h
 
z
 
 
 
P
r
 
Z
 
z
 
j
H
j
 
j
R
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
r
 
B
 
 
h
 
z
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, for any
S
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D,
P
r
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S
 
 
P
r
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S and
A
H
 
G
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P
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P
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(as long as
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , which we may assume as oth-
erwise the lemma is trivially satisﬁed). This completes the
proof.